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Effects of classical/quantum correlations and operations in game theory are analyzed using Samar-
itan’s Dilemma. We observe that introducing either quantum or classical correlations to the game
results in the emergence of a unique or multiple Nash equilibria (NE) which do not exist in the
original classical game. It is shown that the strategies creating the NE and the amount of payoffs
the players receive at these NE’s depend on the type of the correlation. We also discuss whether
the Samaritan can resolve the dilemma acting unilaterally.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is an interdisciplinary approach that can
offer insights into economic, political, and social situa-
tions which involve decision makers who have different
goals and preferences and who know that their actions
affect each other. Since the activities of the decision mak-
ers include information processing and a physical system
is needed for the implementation of the games, it is no
surprise that, currently, game theory is becoming an at-
tractive research topic within the quantum information
community [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11].
By introducing quantum operations and/or quantum
correlations into the game theory, a number of games
including Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) [1], Battle of Sexes
(BoS) [2], Monty Hall problem (MH) [3], Chicken Game
(CG) [4], and matching pennies (MP) [5] have been stud-
ied. Recently, there has been efforts to form a general
theory of quantum games [12, 13]. The results of the
games when played with the tools of quantum mechanics
have been shown to be very different from those of their
classical counterparts, e.g. the dilemma of the prisoners
have been resolved in the quantum game. Since the field
is very new and on its way of development, it is necessary
to study quantum versions of various classical games and
analyze them within the paradigm of quantum mechanics
to understand the new features introduced by quantum
mechanics better.
A game Γ can be denoted by Γ = [N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ]
where N is the set of players, Si is the strategy set
for i-th player, and ui is the payoff function from the
set of all possible strategy combinations into the set
of real numbers for the i-th player. Then the pay-
off for the i-th player can be denoted as ui(s) where
s is the combination of the strategies implemented by
all players. A two-player game with each player hav-
ing the strategy sets SA and SB can be represented as
Γ = [{Alice,Bob}, (SA, SB), (uA, uB)] from which, for
example, Alice’s payoff for the strategy combination of
Bob:α1 Bob: β1
Alice: α1 (a,w) (b, x)
Alice: β1 (c, y) (d, z)
TABLE I: 2-by-2 game payoff matrix
(α, β) where α ∈ SA and β ∈ SB can be written as
uA(α, β). In classical game theory, any game is fully
described by its payoff matrix. Based on the nature of
payoffs, games can be classified in three different ways (i)
symmetric, uA(α, β) = uB(β, α), and asymmetric games,
uA(α, β) 6= uB(β, α), (ii) zero-sum, uA(α, β)+uB(α, β) =
0 for ∀α ∈ SA, and non-zero sum games, if for ∃α ∈ SA
and ∃β ∈ SB, uA(α, β) + uB(α, β) 6= 0 , and (iii) coor-
dination if the game has at least one Nash equilibrium
(NE), and discoordination games if there is no NE in pure
strategies [15].
Nash equilibrium is the most commonly used equilib-
rium concept for strategic games, and it can be regarded
as the steady state of the strategic interaction. The con-
cept of NE is based on the premises that each player acts
rationally according to the belief he/she has on the other
player, and that the beliefs of each player about the other
one is correct. Once the players acts according to NE, no
one can take another action to unilaterally deviate from
it in order to increase his/her payoff. In an NE, each
player’s choice of action is the best response to the ac-
tions taken by the other player. Although in pure strate-
gies an NE need not exist, there is always at least one NE
in mixed strategies where the players are allowed to ran-
domize among their action. The most common difficulty
encountered in the concept of NE is that NE need not
be unique. There might be multiple NE’s which avoids
making sharp decisions. In such cases, certain NE’s can
be isolated as “focal” in that they are clearly better for
all players, and they yield a higher payoff to every player
than any other NE’s. If there exists only one NE like this,
then players will be self-enforced to play it, thus solving
Bob: Work (W) Bob: Loaf (L)
Alice: Aid (A) (3, 2) → (−1, 3)
↑ ↓
Alice: No Aid (N) (−1, 1) ← (0, 0)
TABLE II: Payoff matrix for Welfare Game where Alice is the
Samaritan and Bob is the beneficiary. Arrows show the best
response of a player for a chosen strategy of the other player.
Any strategy pointed by two arrows is an NE. In this game,
there is no such a situation, therefore the game has no NE in
classical pure strategies.
the difficulty induced by multiple NE’s.
An example of payoff matrix is given in Table I for
a two-player-two-strategy game where SA = SB =
{α1, β1}. The payoffs of players for all possible strat-
egy combinations are represented as (.., ..) with the first
element being Alice’s payoff and the second Bob’s. This
payoff matrix represents a symmetric game if a = w,
(b, x) = (y, c), and d = z; and it represents a zero-sum
game if a + w = b + x = c + y = d + z = 0. When
a > c, d > b, x > w, y > z or c > a, b > d, w > x, z > y
is satisfied, it represents a discoordination game. On the
other hand, for example, if a > c, d > b, w > x, z > y,
the game becomes a coordination game with two NE’s in
pure strategies.
If we look at the games which have been studied using
the quantum mechanical tools, we see that, except the
MH and MP games, which are sequential move games,
all the games are simultaneous move games. The proper-
ties of the simultaneous move games studied so far, then
can be listed as: PD&CG: non-zero-sum, symmetric, co-
ordination; and BoS: non-zero-sum, asymmetric, coordi-
nation. Although, for these games, it has been shown
that pure quantum strategies bring interesting features
and, in some cases, resolve the dilemmas of the game, it
is not very clear whether quantum strategies can resolve
problems in other types of games or payoff matrices. It
is, therefore, interesting to study other games belong-
ing to different classes and having different payoff matrix
structures. One of such payoff matrices is that of the so
called “Welfare game” or as often referred to as “Samar-
itan’s dilemma,” which can be classified as a non-zero-
sum, asymmetric, and discoordination game. This game
is chosen because it appears in a wide range of social,
economical, and political issues and the dilemma present
in the game is as strong as the dilemmas existing in PD
and BoS games.
In this paper, we study the Welfare game whose payoff
matrix is shown in Table II. The paper is organized as
follows: In Sec. II, we will introduce the classical game
and discuss the game using both pure and mixed clas-
sical strategies without any shared correlation between
the players. Then in Sec. III, we will introduce the
quantum version of the game and show the features of
the game in different situations: (i) quantum operations
with shared quantum correlations, (ii) quantum opera-
tions with shared classical correlations, (iii) classical op-
erations with shared classical correlations, and (iv) classi-
cal operations with shared quantum correlations. Section
IV will include a discussion of whether the players can
resolve the dilemma by unilateral actions, and finally, in
Sec. V, we will give a brief summary and discussion of
our results.
II. WELFARE GAME AND SAMARITAN’S
DILEMMA
The Samaritan’s Dilemma arises whenever actual or
anticipated “altruistic” behavior of the “Samaritan” (Al-
ice) leads to exploitation on the part of the potential
beneficiary (Bob), such that Alice suffers a welfare loss
when compared to the situation that would have been ob-
tained if Bob had not acted strategically [14, 15]. Most
people have personally experienced this dilemma when
confronted with people “in need.” Although there is a
desire to help those people who cannot help themselves,
there is the recognition that a handout may be harmful
to the long-run interests of the recipient. If the condition
of the person in need is beyond that person’s control,
then there is no dilemma for Samaritan. However, the
person in need can influence or create situations which
will evoke Samaritan’s help. Then, a dilemma arises be-
cause Samaritan wants to help, however, the action of
the person in need leads an increase in the amount of
help which is not desirable for the Samaritan. Moreover,
Samaritan cannot retaliate to minimize or stop this ex-
ploitation because doing so, which is a punishment for
the people in need, will harm the Samaritan’s own inter-
ests in the short run. The Samaritans Dilemma, which
was modelled as a two-person strategic game by the No-
bel Laureate economist James Buchanan, is widespread
in a wide range of distinct issue areas from international
politics, government welfare programs, and family issues
[14].
The game and the payoff matrix studied in this paper
are taken from Ref.[15] where the specific game is named
as The Welfare Game. In this game, Alice wishes to aid
Bob if he searches for work but not otherwise. On the
other hand, Bob searches for work if he cannot get aid
from Alice.
Now let us analyze this classical game for pure and
mixed strategies. The strategy combinations can be
listed as (A,W ), (A,L), (N,W ), and (N,L). When play-
ers use only pure strategies, there is no dominant strategy
for neither of the players and, moreover, there is no NE,
that is why this is a discoordination game. This can be
explained as follows: (A,W) is not an NE because if Al-
ice chooses A, Bob can respond with strategy L where
he gets a better payoff (three) as shown with arrow in
2
Table II. (A,L) is not an NE because, in this case, Alice
will switch to N. The strategies (N,L) and (N,W) are not
NE either, because for the former one Bob will switch
to W to get payoff one, whereas for the latter case Al-
ice will switch to A to increase her payoff from −1 to 3.
Therefore, this game has no NE when played with pure
classical strategies.
In mixed classical strategies, we assign the probabilities
p and (1−p) to the events that Alice chooses strategies A
and N, respectively. In the same way, for Bob’s choices
of W and L, we assign the probabilities q and (1 − q).
Then the payoffs for Alice and Bob become
$A = 3pq − p(1− q)− q(1− p),
$B = 2pq + 3p(1− q) + q(1 − p). (1)
It can be easily shown that p = 0.5 and q = 0.2 corre-
spond to the NE for the game with average payoffs given
as $A = −0.2 and $B = 1.5. In this case, the payoff of
Alice is negative which is not a desirable result for her.
(A,L) and (N,L) emerge as the most probable strategies
with probabilities 0.4.
Samaritan’s dilemma game is a very good example of
how the altruistic and selfish behavior of the players can
affect a game and its dynamics. It is different than the
other already studied games because it has no NE in pure
strategies and it is only Alice who is facing the dilemma.
Games with no NE are interesting because they represent
situations in which individual players might never settle
down to a stable solution. Therefore, the important step
in resolving the dilemma is to find an NE on which the
players can settle down.
In this work, we look for the strategies utilizing clas-
sical or quantum mechanical toolboxes to find solutions
to the following problem: Is there a unique NE where
the players can settle? If the answer to this question is
YES, then we ask how the payoffs of the players compare
with each other and to what extent this NE strategy can
resolve the dilemma: CASE I: $A < 0 (insufficient solu-
tion), CASE II: 0 ≤ $A ≤ $B (weak solution), and CASE
III: 0 ≤ $B < $A (strong solution). Finding a unique NE
is the first step in resolving the dilemma. The positive
payoffs players receive at a unique NE means that both
players are satisfied with the outcome and there is no
loss of resources for Alice (CASE II and III). The most
desirable solution of the dilemma for Alice is represented
in CASE III which can easily be seen from the original
payoff matrix shown in Table II.
III. QUANTUM VERSION OF THE GAME AND
EFFECTS OF VARIOUS STRATEGIC SPACES
Since the Welfare Game is a two-player game, quantum
strategies can be introduced using the physical model
given in Fig.1 [1]. In this physical model, starting from
FIG. 1: Schematic configuration of the quantum version of
2×2 strategic games. The operations inside the dotted boxes
are performed by the referee.
an initial product state |ψ0〉 = |fg〉, the referee prepares
the maximally entangled state (MES) ρˆin = Jˆ |ψ0〉〈ψ0|Jˆ†
where Jˆ is the entangling operator defined as
Jˆ |fg〉 = 1√
2
[ |fg〉+ i(−1)(f+g)|(1− f)(1− g)〉 ] (2)
with f, g = 0, 1. In this scheme, Jˆ is chosen such that the
original classical game can be reproduced if the classical
strategies A and W are defined with the identity operator
σ0, and N and L are defined with the bit flip operator iσy
when |ψ0〉 = |00〉. Assignment of the operators to the
classical strategies denoted by A,W,N, and L is initial
state dependent, i.e., when |ψ0〉 = |01〉, A and L should
be defined with σ0, while N and W with iσy.
Let us assume that the referee prepares ρˆin and sends
one of the qubits of this state to Alice and the other one
to Bob. Alice and Bob perform local operations, respec-
tively, denoted by UˆA and UˆB on each of their qubits
separately. After these operations, the resulting state
becomes
ρˆout = (UˆA ⊗ UˆB)ρˆin(Uˆ †A ⊗ Uˆ †B). (3)
The referee who receives this final state first per-
forms Jˆ†ρˆoutJˆ and then makes a projective measure-
ment Πn = |jℓ〉〈jℓ|{j,ℓ=0,1} with n = 2j + ℓ corre-
sponding to the projection onto the orthonormal basis
{|AW〉, |AL〉, |NW〉, |NL〉} = {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉}. Ac-
cording to the measurement outcome n, the referee as-
signs to each player the payoff chosen from the payoff
matrix given in Table II, e.g., if n = 0 then the payoffs
assigned to Alice and Bob are 3 and 2, respectively. Then
the average payoff of the players can be written as
$A =
∑
n
anTr(ΠnJˆ
†ρˆoutJˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pjℓ
$B =
∑
n
bnTr(ΠnJˆ
†ρˆoutJˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pjℓ
(4)
with a{n=0,1,2,3} = {3,−1,−1, 0} and b{n=0,1,2,3} =
{2, 3, 1, 0} being the payoffs of Alice and Bob chosen from
Table II. Pjℓ represents the probability of obtaining the
measurement outcome n.
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Players are restricted to choose their operators, UˆA and
UˆB, from two- and one-parameter SU(2) as
UˆA =


eiφA cos θA2 sin
θA
2
− sin θA2 e−iφA cos θA2

 , (5)
with 0 ≤ φA ≤ π/2 and 0 ≤ θA ≤ π. Bob’s operator,
UˆB(θB, φB), can be obtained in the same way by replac-
ing A with B in Eq.(5) [16]. In the following subsec-
tions, we investigate the evolution of the Welfare Game
with various strategy sets: (A) Quantum operations and
quantum correlations, (B) quantum operations and clas-
sical correlations, (C) classical operations and classical
correlations, and (D) classical operations and quantum
correlations.
A. Quantum operations and quantum correlations
Before proceeding further, it is worth noting that if the
players use quantum operations with no shared correlated
states, then the situation is similar to playing the game
with classical mixed strategies which is discussed in Sec.
II.
1. One-parameter SU(2) operators
This operator set for Alice and Bob can be obtained
from Eq.(5) by setting φA = 0 and φB = 0. First, let
us assume that |ψ0〉 = |00〉, thus the entangled state
becomes ρˆin = |ψin〉〈ψin| with |ψin〉 = [|00〉 + i|11〉]/
√
2.
Then the payoff for Alice and Bob are found as
$A =
1
4
[1 + 3(cos θA + cos θB) + 5 cos θA cos θB],
$B =
1
2
[3 + 2 cos θA − cos θA cos θB]. (6)
It is seen from Eq.(6) that $B is always positive whereas
$A is either positive or negative depending on the ac-
tion of Bob. Therefore, Alice cannot always get a pos-
itive payoff and hence cannot resolve her dilemma by
acting unilaterally and independently of Bob’s strat-
egy. After some straightforward calculations, it can be
found that players can achieve an NE if they choose
(θA = π/2, cos θB = −3/5) corresponding to the oper-
ators UˆA = (σ0 + iσy)/
√
2 and UˆB = (σ0 + i2σy)/
√
5
where σi are the Pauli operators. At this unique NE, the
payoffs for the players become $A = −0.2 and $B = 1.5.
On the other hand, when the initial state is |ψ0〉 = |01〉,
an NE is found at (θA = π/2, cos θB = 3/5) correspond-
ing to UˆA = (σ0 + iσy)/
√
2 and UˆB = (2σ0 + iσy)/
√
5
with the payoffs $A = −0.2 and $B = 1.5.
It is seen that playing the quantum version of the game
with one-parameter set of operators and a shared MES
between the players reproduces the results of the classical
mixed strategy. Both cases have one NE with the same
payoffs $A = −0.2 and $B = 1.5. This strategy set re-
solves the dilemma, but with an insufficient solution for
Alice (CASE I).
2. Two-parameter SU(2) operators
This set of quantum operations is defined as given in
Eq.(5). For the case when |ψ0〉 = |00〉, the expressions
for the payoffs are given as $A = 3P00 − P01 − P10 and
$B = 2P00 + 3P01 + P10 with
P00 = cos
2(θA/2) cos
2(θB/2) cos
2(φA + φB)
P01 = |x sinφB − y cosφA|2
P10 = |x cosφB − y sinφA|2 (7)
where Pjℓ is calculated from Eq. (4) and we set x =
sin(θA/2) cos(θB/2) and y = cos(θA/2) sin(θB/2). A
straightforward analysis of these equations reveals that
there is a unique NE which appears at (θA = 0, φA =
π/2, θB = 0, φB = π/2) corresponding to UˆA = UˆB = iσz
with the payoff ($A, $B) given as (3, 2). We see that in-
troducing quantum operations and correlations results
in the emergence of this NE point which cannot be seen
when the game is played with pure classical strategies.
Thus the original discoordination game becomes a coor-
dination game. This unique NE gives Alice the highest
payoff she can get in this game. This is the NE point
where Alice always wants to achieve because both play-
ers benefit from playing the game, moreover, Alice does
not lose her resources. Therefore, Alice’s dilemma is re-
solved in the stronger sense (CASE III). It is also seen
that players receive higher payoffs than those obtained if
a classical mixed strategy were used.
This new move of the players can be included into
the game payoff matrix as a new strategy [6]. This, in-
deed, shows that the quantum strategy introduced into
the game transformed the original (2×2) game into a new
game which can be described with the new (3× 3) payoff
matrix. The new payoff matrix of the game is shown in
Table III where the new strategy UˆA = UˆB = iσz for the
players are depicted as M. This new game payoff matrix
includes the original classical game payoff matrix as its
subset. Consequently, one can say that the classical game
is a subgame of its quantum version. In other words, one
can say that in order to reproduce the same results of
this quantum game in classical settings, the players, Al-
ice and Bob, should be given the strategy sets {A,N,M}
and {W,L,M}, respectively. Then in order to classically
communicate their chosen strategy to the referee, each
player needs 2 classical bits (c-bits) resulting in a total of
4 c-bits. Note that the same task is completed using four
qubits (two prepared by the referee and distributed, and
two qubits sent by the players back to the referee after
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Bob: W Bob: L Bob:M
Alice: A (3, 2) (−1, 3) (0, 0)
Alice: N (−1, 1) (0, 0) (−1, 3)
Alice: M (0, 0) (−1, 1) (3,2)
TABLE III: The new payoff matrix for the Welfare game
which includes the new strategy for the players to resolve the
dilemma of the game. The new strategy iσz which is incorpo-
rated into the payoff matrix as the classical strategy M is the
operator which resolves the dilemma of the game when play-
ers share the quantum correlation [|00〉 + i|11〉]/√2, and use
two-parameter SU(2) operators. The original classical game
payoff matrix (gray colored) is seen as a 2 × 2 sub-matrix.
The entry of the matrix in solid box corresponds to the NE.
being operated on) when shared entanglement is used.
This corresponds to a communication cost of 2 e-bits (1
e-bit for the referee and 1 e-bit for the players).
On the other hand, when |ψ0〉 = |01〉, we found four
NE’s with equal payoffs ($A, $B) = (3, 2) when the
players choose the following quantum operations (θA =
π, φA = 0, θB = 0, φB = π/2), (θA = π/2, φA = 0, θB =
π/2, φB = π/2), (θA = 2π/3, φA = 0, θB = π/3, φB =
π/2), and (θA = 3π/4, φA = 0, θB = π/4, φB =
π/2). These, respectively, correspond to the opera-
tors (UˆA, UˆB) as follows (N,P) = (iσy, iσz), (T,Q) =
(σ0+iσy)√
2
,
i(σz+σy)√
2
), (Y,R) =
σ0+i
√
3σy
2 ,
i(
√
3σz+σy)
2 ), and
(Z, S) = (γ0(σ0 + ia1σy), ib0(σz + b1σy)) where γ0 =
cos(3π/8), γ1 = tan(3π/8), δ0 = cos(π/8), and δ1 =
tan(π/8). These NE’s have higher payoffs for both play-
ers than those obtained when a classical mixed strategy
is used. However, in this pure quantum strategy case, the
dilemma of the Samaritan (Alice) still continues, because
both players cannot decide which NE point to choose.
For example, if Alice thinks that Bob will play iσz then
she will play iσy to reach at the first NE. However, since
this is a simultaneous move game and there is no clas-
sical communication between the players, Bob may play
i(σz+σy)√
2
(because this action will take him to the second
NE point) while Alice plays iσy. Such a case will result
in the case $A < $B and will lower the payoffs of both
players. Therefore, still a dilemma exists in the game;
however the nature of dilemma has changed.
As we have done for the previous case, these four new
strategies which give NE’s can be added to the payoff
matrix of the original game. This results in a (5 × 6)
payoff matrix, as depicted in Table IV, which has the
original classical game as a subgame. If the players are
given this payoff matrix and restricted to classical com-
munication then a total of 6 c-bits are needed to play this
game whereas in quantum strategies what is needed is 2
e-bits.
With these results, it is seen that the dynamics of the
game, that is whether the dilemma is resolved or not,
the strategies, and the payoffs of the players depend on
the initial state and hence on the shared MES. So far,
we have considered the case that the referee not only
prepares the MES but also informs the players of the
initial state. Thus the players knowing the shared MES
can choose their best moves to resolve the dilemma. If
they do not know which type of the MES they share,
the players cannot decide which of the above discussed
strategies to apply. Then it becomes interesting to ask
the question of what the best strategy is for the players if
they do not know the input state or even more interesting
is the question of what they can do if the source the
referee uses is corrupt.
Assuming that the source prepares the state |00〉 with
probability p and |01〉 with probability 1 − p, the state
distributed to the players by the referee becomes ρˆin =
pJˆ |00〉〈00|Jˆ† + (1 − p)Jˆ |01〉〈01|Jˆ†. Hence the payoffs
for the players become as $A = p$
′
A + (1 − p)$
′′
A and
$B = p$
′
B + (1 − p)$
′′
B where the expressions with
′ and
′′ corresponds to the payoffs the players receive when
the input state is |00〉 and |01〉, respectively. This mod-
ification of the payoffs results in the emergence of new
strategies and NE’s for different values of p. The prob-
lem becomes very unpleasant for the players because the
number of NE’s increases preventing the players from re-
solving the dilemma. To give an idea on the strategies of
the players which give rise new NE’s, we listed some of
them in Table V.
B. Quantum operations and classical correlations
First let us assume that operators are chosen from the
two parameter SU(2) set while sharing classical correla-
tions. This can occur, for example, when one or both
players induce phase damping on the originally shared
MES until the off-diagonal elements of the density op-
erator disappears or the referee distributes such a state
to them. If we assume that the initially shared MES
is |ψin〉 = [|00〉 − i|11〉]/
√
2, then the shared correlation
will become the classical correlation ρˆin = [|00〉〈00| +
|11〉〈11|]/2 after the damping. This new setting of the
problem is depicted in Fig.(2) from which the payoffs for
the players are calculated as
$A=
1
4
[1 + 5 cos θA cos θB − 3 sin θA sin θB sin(φA + φB)]
$B=
1
2
[3− cos θA cos θB − 2 sin θA sin θB cosφA sinφB ](8)
Alice cannot obtain a positive payoff by acting unilater-
ally and should try for NE. We find that there appears
an NE with a payoff (0.25, 1.5) when UˆB = (σ0+iσy)/
√
2
and Alice restricts herself to one parameter SU(2) oper-
ators that is φA = 0 and {∀θA : 0 ≤ θA ≤ π}. Since
neither of the players can make her/his payoff arbitrarily
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Bob: W Bob: L Bob: P Bob: Q Bob: R Bob: S
Alice: A (3, 2) (−1, 3) (−1, 1) (1, 32 ) (0, 54 ) (1−
√
2, 6−
√
2
4 )
Alice: N (−1, 1) (0, 0) (3,2) (1, 32 ) (2, 74 ) (1 +
√
2, 6+
√
2
4 )
Alice: T (1, 32 ) (− 12 , 32 ) (1, 32 ) (3,2) (1 +
√
3, 6+
√
3
4 ) (1 +
√
2, 6+
√
2
4 )
Alice: Y (0, 54 ) (− 14 , 34 ) (2, 74 ) (1 +
√
3, 6+
√
3
4 ) (3,2) (1 +
√
2 +
√
3, 6+
√
2+
√
3
4 )
Alice: Z (1−√2, 6−
√
2
4 ) (
√
2−2
4 ,
3(2−
√
2)
4 ) (1 +
√
2, 6+
√
2
4 ) (1 +
√
2, 6+
√
2
4 ) (1 +
√
2 +
√
3, 6+
√
2+
√
3
4 ) (3,2)
TABLE IV: New payoff matrix for the Welfare game when players share the quantum correlation [|01〉 − i|10〉]/√2, and use
two-parameter SU(2) operators. The operators which results in new NE’s are included together with the original payoff matrix
(upper left 2× 2 sub-matrix). The elements in square boxes correspond to NE’s in this game. Gray colored (2× 2) submatrix
corresponds to the original classical game payoff matrix.
(UˆA, UˆB) ($A, $B)
p = 1/4 (σ0, σ0) (0, 11/4)
(iσy , iσz) (2, 9/4)
p = 1/2 (σ0, iσy) (1, 5/2)
(iσy , iσz) (1, 5/2)
(iσz, iσz) (1, 5/2)
p = 3/4 (σ0, iσy) (0, 11/4)
(iσz, iσz) (2, 9/4)
TABLE V: Strategies of players at the NE points and their
corresponding payoffs when the source is corrupted. The play-
ers should know the characteristic of the source to decide on
their strategy. p and (1− p) are, respectively, the probability
that |00〉〈00| and |01〉〈01| are sent from the source.
noise
FIG. 2: Introducing classical correlations into the quantum
version of the Welfare game. ρˆin is the classical correlations
obtained from the MES after it is subjected to noise. The op-
erations inside the dotted boxes are performed by the referee.
high and positive independent of the action of the other
player, these operation sets for Alice and Bob which re-
sults in an NE is the only self-enforcing solution. Consid-
ering that the players are rational they will choose this
set of operations, consequently the dilemma for Alice will
be resolved (CASE II).
When the shared correlation is in the form ρˆin =
[|01〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10|]/2, the payoffs of the players are given
as in Eq. (8) with all the − being replaced by + and
vice verse except the + in the sin(..) term. Conse-
quently, we find an NE when UˆA = (σ0 + iσy)/
√
2 and
UˆB = i(σy + σz)/
√
2 are chosen which gives the payoffs
as ($A, $B) = (2.5, 1). This NE is a self-enforcing point
because by the choice of this specific UˆA, Alice assures a
positive payoff for herself and at the same time for Bob
which is independent of Bob’s action. When Alice applies
this operation then the only thing that one can expect
from a rational Bob is to maximize his payoff by apply-
ing the above UˆB. Therefore dilemma is resolved (CASE
III).
If the players share a full rank classical correlation that
is ρˆin = [|00〉〈00|+ |10〉〈10|+ |01〉〈01|+ |11〉〈11|]/4, they
get constant payoff (0.25, 1.5) independent of their quan-
tum operations, and thus arriving at CASE II.
On the other hand, when the players are restricted
to one-parameter SU(2) operators, they get the payoff
(0.25, 1.5) at the NE with UˆA = UˆB = (σ0 + iσy)/
√
2
independent of the classical correlation they share.
These results suggest that after the maximally entan-
gled state is distributed by the referee, Alice and/or Bob
can induce damping to her/his qubit so that the quan-
tum correlation becomes a classical one. Then they can
have unique strategy to go to an NE where both gets
positive payoffs. It must be noted that these solutions of
the game cannot be achieved by unilateral move of Alice
or Bob. That is, the dilemma is resolved only with the
condition that players are enforced to play the strategy
that will take both of them to the NE.
C. Classical operations and classical correlations
Classical operations are a subset of quantum opera-
tions. The players have two operations either the iden-
tity operator σ0 or the flip operator iσy. Here we con-
sider the classical correlations as in the above subsec-
tion. Let us assume that the classical correlation is
ρˆin = [|00〉〈00| + |11〉〈11|]/2. Due to this classical cor-
relation, the diagonal and off-diagonal elements of the
payoff matrix of the original game (Table II) are aver-
aged out separately, resulting in a new game with the
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Bob: σ0 Bob: iσy
Alice: σ0 (1.5, 1) → (−1, 2)
↑ ↓
Alice: iσy (−1, 2) ← (1.5, 1)
TABLE VI: The new payoff matrix for the Welfare game
when players share the classical correlation ρˆin = [|00〉〈00| +
|11〉〈11|]/2, and use classical operations.
payoff matrix given in Table VI without any correlation.
From Table VI, it is seen that the game is still a dis-
coordination game with no NE and the dilemma sur-
vives. When the classical correlation is ρˆin = [|01〉〈01|+
|10〉〈10|]/2, the payoff matrix has the same properties
as in Table VI with diagonal and off-diagonal elements
interchanged.
The game becomes more interesting if we now let the
players choose a mixed strategy when applying the clas-
sical operations, that is Alice and Bob apply σ0, respec-
tively, with probabilities p and q, and iσy, respectively,
with probabilities 1− p and 1− q. In this case, it can be
easily shown that there is a unique NE when p = 0.5 and
q = 0.2 with payoff (0.25,1.5). Although, the values of p
and q at NE is the same as the case discussed in Section
II where only classical mixed strategy for the operators
are allowed without any correlated shared state, there is
an increase in the payoff of Alice from −0.2 to 0.25 ow-
ing to the shared classical correlation. This is interesting
because an NE appears where both Alice and Bob have
positive payoff, implying that the dilemma is resolved in
the weaker sense (CASE II).
D. Classical operations and quantum correlations
Since in this quantization scheme, the classical oper-
ators of the players σ0 and iσy commute with Jˆ
†, the
operations in the physical system reduces to players’ ap-
plication of their choice of classical operations (identity or
flip operator) onto the |ψ0〉 from which the referee gen-
erates the maximally entangled state according to Eq.
(2) and then referee’s projective measurement onto the
four basis {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉} to calculate their payoff
according to the outcome. Then the payoff matrix of the
game becomes the same as that of the original one in Ta-
ble II. The game is still a discoordination game with no
NE at pure strategies. Therefore, the characteristics of
the game when played with pure and/or mixed strategies
is the same as explained in Sec. II.
IV. BOB RESTRICTED TO ONLY CLASSICAL
OPERATIONS
Since the dilemma in this game is that of Alice, it is
natural to ask the question whether she can escape from
this dilemma by restricting Bob to only classical oper-
ations while she uses quantum operations. We assume
that the players share the MES, [|00〉+ i|11〉]/√2, Alice
uses a fixed quantum operator UˆA chosen from the set of
general SU(2) operators given as
UˆA =


eiφA cos θA2 e
iϕA sin θA2
−e−iϕA sin θA2 e−iφA cos θA2

 , (9)
with 0 ≤ φA, ϕA ≤ π/2 and 0 ≤ θA ≤ π, and Bob applies
a mixed classical strategy that is he applies Uˆ0B = σ0 with
probability p0 and Uˆ
1
B = iσy with probability p1 where
p0 + p1 = 1. Then what is the best strategy for Alice to
solve her dilemma?
In this setting, the state after Alice and Bob apply
their operators becomes
ρˆout =
1∑
k=0
pk(UˆA ⊗ UˆkB)ρˆin(Uˆ †A ⊗ Uˆk†B )
= p ρˆ′out + (1− p) ρˆ′′out, (10)
where ρˆ′out and ρˆ
′′
out are the output density operators
when Bob applies σ0 and iσy, respectively, and we have
used p = p0. The average payoffs can be calculated from
Eq. (4) as
$A =
∑
n
anPjℓ =
∑
n
an(pP
′
jℓ + (1− p)P ′′jℓ)
$B =
∑
n
anPjℓ =
∑
n
bn(pP
′
jℓ + (1− p)P ′′jℓ) (11)
from which we can write
P00 = p cos
2(
θA
2
) cos2 φA + (1− p) sin2(θA
2
) sin2 ϕA
P01 = (1− p) cos2(θA
2
) cos2 φA + p sin
2(
θA
2
) sin2 ϕA
P10 = (1− p) cos2(θA
2
) sin2 φA + p sin
2(
θA
2
) cos2 ϕA(12)
When UˆA is chosen from one-parameter SU(2) space
that is φA = ϕA = 0, there is an NE for p = 0.2 and
θA = π/2 with Alice and Bob having payoffs −0.2 and
1.5, respectively. This payoff is the same as the case when
both players are restricted to use a quantum pure strat-
egy with one-parameter SU(2) operators which also gives
the same result of classical mixed strategies. Although
this strategy introduces an NE into the game on which
both players can compromise, it is not the most desirable
case for Alice due to her negative payoff while Bob’s is
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Condition Strategy Payoff
No Corr.
(
σ0+iσy√
2
,
σ0+i2σy√
5
)
(− 1
5
, 3
2
)
Quant. Corr.
|00〉+i|11〉√
2
(
σ0+iσy√
2
,
σ0+i2σy√
5
)‡
(− 1
5
, 3
2
)
(iσz, iσz) (3, 2)
|01〉−i|10〉√
2
(
σ0+iσy√
2
,
2σ0+iσy√
5
)‡
(− 1
5
, 3
2
)
(iσy, iσz) (3, 2)(
σ0+iσy√
2
,
iσz+iσy√
2
)
(3, 2)(
σ0+i
√
3σy
2
,
i
√
3σz+iσy
2
)
(3, 2)
(γ0(σ0 + iγ1σy), iδ0(σz + δ1σy)) (3, 2)
Class. Corr.
|00〉〈00|+|11〉〈11|
2
(
σ0+iσy√
2
,
σ0+iσy√
2
)‡
( 1
4
, 3
2
)
(
φA = 0,
σ0+iσy√
2
)
( 1
4
, 3
2
)
|01〉〈01|+|10〉〈10|
2
(
σ0+iσy√
2
,
σ0+iσy√
2
)‡
( 1
4
, 3
2
)
(
σ0+iσy√
2
,
i(σy+σz)√
2
)
( 5
2
, 1)
Full rank
(
∀ UˆA,∀ UˆB
)
( 1
4
, 3
2
)
TABLE VII: Effect of the quantum operations (one-or two-
parameter SU(2) operators) of the players when they share
quantum or classical correlations. Only the strategies
(UˆA, UˆB) where NE points emerge and the payoffs ($A, $B)
that the players get at the specified NE are listed. σi’s de-
note the Pauli spin operators, γ0 and γ1, respectively, are
cos(3pi/8) and tan(3pi/8) while δ0 and δ1, are cos(pi/8) and
tan(pi/8), respectively. ‡ denotes the results when players
use one-parameter SU(2) operators. Results are the same for
one- and two-parameter SU(2) operators for the cases of no
correlation and when the shared correlated state is full rank.
Classical and quantum correlations are denoted by “Class.
Corr.” and “Quant. Corr.”, respectively.
positive (CASE I). Indeed, when the payoffs are analyzed
in detail, it can be seen that Alice can never achieve, for
any value of θA a positive payoff independent of Bob’s
strategy defined by p.
If Alice chooses her operator from two-parameter
Condition Strategy Payoff
No Corr. No NE —
(pure strategy)
( 1
2
, 1
5
) (− 1
5
, 3
2
)
Quant. Corr. No NE —
(pure strategy)
|00〉+i|11〉√
2
( 1
2
, 1
5
) (− 1
5
, 3
2
)
|01〉−i|10〉√
2
( 1
2
, 4
5
) (− 1
5
, 3
2
)
Class. Corr. No NE —
(pure strategy)
|00〉〈00|+|11〉〈11|
2
( 1
2
, 1
2
) ( 1
4
, 3
2
)
|01〉〈01|+|10〉〈10|
2
( 1
2
, 1
2
) ( 1
4
, 3
2
)
Full rank (∀p,∀q) ( 1
4
, 3
2
)
TABLE VIII: Effect of restricting the operations of the play-
ers to the classical operators σ0 and iσy on the strategies of
the players to achieve NE. In pure strategies there is no NE,
no matter what kind of correlated state is shared between the
players. NE’s appear only in mixed strategies (p, q). Payoffs
($A, $B) and mixed classical strategies (p, q) are given only
for the NE points. p and q denote the probabilities that the
players apply σ0. Classical and quantum correlations are de-
noted by “Class. Corr.” and “Quant. Corr.”, respectively.
SU(2) operators, then it is seen that there is no NE in the
game and there is no strategy for Alice to have a positive
payoff. For any strategy of Alice, Bob can find a p value
that will minimize Alice’s payoff and vice verse.
When Alice decides to choose her operator as a general
SU(2) operator, she will have three parameters to opti-
mize her payoff. In this case, we find that payoffs of both
players become independent of Bob’s strategy when Al-
ice’s strategy is either (θ = π/2, φ = ϕ = π/4) resulting
in UˆA = [σ0 + i(σx + σy + σz)]/2 or (θ = π/2, φ = 0, ϕ =
π/2) resulting in UˆA = (σ0 + iσx)/
√
2. The players get
the payoffs (0.25, 1.5) and (1, 2.5), respectively, for the
first and second strategies (CASE II). On the other hand,
if Alice applies the operator (θ = π/2, φ = 0, ϕ = π/4)
that is UˆA = [σ0 + i(σx + σy)/
√
2 ]/
√
2 or (θ = π/2, φ =
π/4, ϕ = π/2) that is UˆA = [σ0 + i(
√
2σx + σz)]/2, then
while Bob’s payoff becomes 2 and is independent of his
own strategy, the payoff of Alice is dependent on Bob’s
strategy through $A = (1+ 3p)/4 and $A = 1− 3p/4, re-
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spectively, for the first and second operators. With these
moves of Alice, both players get positive payoffs which
resolves the dilemma in the weak sense (CASE II).
A selfish and evil-thinking Bob might try to prevent
Alice having a positive payoff. Then the only thing he
can do is to induce damping on his qubit until the initial
MES becomes a mixed state with no off-diagonal ele-
ments (classical correlation). However, in this case, Al-
ice can choose her operator such that θA = π/2 making
both her and Bob’s payoff independent of Bob’s strat-
egy. This results in a positive payoff for both players
with $A = 0.25 and $B = 1.5 resolving Alice’s dilemma
as in CASE II.
It is understood that by acting unilaterally Alice can
resolve her dilemma only when she is allowed to use oper-
ators chosen from three-parameter SU(2) set and Bob is
restricted to classical operations. Even in this case, only
a solution satisfying CASE II is achieved. When Bob is
also allowed to use the same type of operator, for each
operator of Alice, Bob can always find an operator which
will put Alice into dilemma.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we have discussed the effects of classical
and quantum correlations in the Welfare Game using the
quantization scheme proposed by Eisert et al. [1]. This
comparative study of the effects of classical/quantum cor-
relations and classical/quantum operations not only con-
firmed some of the known effects of using the quantum
mechanical toolbox in game theory but also revealed that
in some circumstances one need not stick to quantum
operations or correlations but rather use simple classical
correlations and operations. This can be clearly seen in
Tables VII-IX which summarize the results of this study.
The significant effect of using the quantum operations
with shared quantum correlation between the players is
the emergence of NE’s which turn the game into a coor-
dination game. Together with the results of other games
studied using the quantum mechanical toolbox, we can
say that there is at least one NE in 2 × 2 games with
arbitrary payoff matrices when played using one or two
parameter SU(2) operators. Sometimes there can emerge
more than one NE with either the same or different pay-
offs based on the structure of the payoff matrix of the
original game. When this happens, players are indiffer-
ent between the multiple NE. Then it becomes unclear
how the players should behave, therefore this NE cannot
be taken as a solution for the problem. In such cases,
introducing the quantum mechanical toolbox does not
make the things easier but rather more complicated.
The surprising result of this study is that the dilemma
of Alice can be resolved with the weak (CASE II) and
strong (CASE III) solutions even with classical correla-
tions provided that the players are allowed to use quan-
Class. Op. Q uant. Op.
Q1 Q2
No. Corr. I I I
Class. Corr.
(|00〉〈00| + |11〉〈11|)/2 II II II
(|01〉〈01| + |10〉〈10|)/2 II II III
Full rank II II II
Quant. Corr.
(|00〉 + i|11〉)/√2 I I III
(|01〉 − i|10〉)/√2 I I n.a
TABLE IX: Solutions to the dilemma in the Welfare game
when the players choose classical and quantum strategies. I,
II and III, respectively, represent CASE I: $A < 0, CASE II:
0 ≤ $A ≤ $B , and CASE III: 0 ≤ $B < $A. n.a which stands
for “not applicable” points out the absence of a unique NE in
the game. For the classical operations, only mixed strategies
are listed because in pure strategies there is no unique NE in
the game. In case of quantum operations, Q1 and Q2 stand
for one- and two-parameter SU(2) operators, respectively.
tum operations. Another point to be noted is that the
strategies of the players to find an NE and the payoffs
they get at this NE depend on the type of the shared
quantum correlation or classical correlation. Without a
priori information on the distributed or shared correla-
tions, the players cannot make their move.
The power of entanglement for this specific game shows
itself in the amount of payoff players get but not whether
it resolves the dilemma or not. When MES are allowed
with two-parameter SU(2) operators, NE’s with payoffs
(3, 2), which has the highest $A + $B value achievable in
this game, emerge. When the dilemma is resolved with
classical correlations, the payoffs the players get are much
smaller, $A + $B = 7/2.
We have to point out that, introducing correlations
into a 2 × 2 noncooperative game transforms it into a
cooperative game which is very different than the orig-
inal game defined with its own rules. In the original
classical game, no communication of any form is allowed
between the players; however in the full quantum strate-
gies, shared entanglement which could be considered as a
kind of “spooky communication” between the players are
introduced into the game [17].
In classical mixed strategies, the payoffs become con-
tinuous in the mixing probability of the players’ actions,
and a compromise becomes possible between the players
which assures the existence of an NE. In games played by
quantum operations, the inclusion of new strategies and
moves into the game is an essential feature. Because,
once these new moves are incorporated, both the strat-
egy space and the payoffs become continuous. With this
continuity, the players can finely adjust their strategies
and come closer to being best responses to each other
which leads to one or more NE’s.
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